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Kelly v. South Carolina
122 S. Ct. 726 (2002)
L Fs
In 1996, William Kelly ("Kelly") was indicted for, and subsequently con-
victed of, capital murder, kidnapping, armed robbery and possession of a knife
during the commission of a violent crime in connection with the death of Shirley
Shealy. During the sentencing phase of Kelly's trial, the prosecution introduced
as evidence o aggravation the fact that Kelly had previously used a shank to
attempt a prison escape and that Kellyexhibited sadistic behavior at an earlyage.
The prosecutor also told the jurythat he hoped theywould "never in [their] lives
again have to experience... [being some thirty feet away from such a person."'
Prior to closing arguments, defense counsel, relying on Sirmi vL South
Qvuh 2 asked the court to instruct jurors that Kelly would be ineligible for
parole were he to receive a life sentence.' The prosecution objected to the
Sinm instruction on the grounds that he did not intend to argue future danger-
ousness. Although the defense responded that the prosecution had already
introduced evidence of future dangerousness, the court nevertheless refused the
instruction.4
During his dosing argument, the prosecutor characterized Kelly as "the
butcher of Batesburg," and "Bloody Billy." He further argued to the jurythat
Kelly was not mentally ill, but rather. "[He's intelligent... he's quick-witted.
Doesn't that make a person a little more dangerous ... ?" Although defense
counsel objected to this commentary, the prosecution persisted and the court
never ruled on the objection. The judge instructed the jurythat "death sentence"
and "life imprisonment" were to be "understood in this ordinary and plain
meaning," but he did not instruct the jury that Kelly would be ineligible for
parole were he to be sentenced to life imprisonment. Defense counsel objected
again to the court's denial of a Sirm instruction, but her objection was over-
ruled. The jury subsequently sentenced Kellyto death.' The Supreme Court of
South Carolina held that the State's evidence did not implicate future dangerous-
1. Kelly v. South Carolina, 122 S. C. 726, 729 (2002).
2. 512 US. 154 (1994).
3. KM, 122 S. Ck. at 729; seSimmons v. South Carolina, 512 US. 154,156 (1994) (holding
that "[when] the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state lawprohibits the defendant's
release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jurybe informed that the defendant is
parole ineligible").
4. K4 122 S. Cr. at 729-30.
5. Id
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ness as an aggravator, and even if the State had relied on future dangerousness,
the Simim instruction has no application to the South Carolina sentencing
scheme The death sentence was affirmed.'
II. Hddig
The United States Supreme Court reversed Kelly's death sentence. It held
that: (1) under the South Carolina sentencing scheme, the Sinrn instruction is
mandatory when future dangerousness is implicated; and (2) that the State did
put future dangerousness at issue.'
MI. A nibsis /Applio8& vim
A. The Simmons Imtbmixt
This case has no direct application in Virginia because the "life-means-life"
instruction was mandated in all capital prosecutions by the Supreme Court of
Virginia in Yarbna# v Ccrnmmkh. 9 In Kdbi the United States Supreme Court
gave short shrift to South Carolina's argument that its capital sentencing scheme
did not require a Svm instructiom' Explaining that its ruling required little
more than a citation to S/apr v Sow Card/n", the Court noted that South
Carolina juries make sentencing recommendations only after a finding of aggra-
vating circumstances; at that point, the only choices available to the jury are life
without parole and death.'2 Therefore, the Court reversed the Supreme Court
of South Carolina on identical grounds as its ruling in Sba.13
B. 71m Coats A rzbiss qfFum.DareWr nss E vdm
The remainder of the majority opinion dealt with the question of whether
the State actually put future dangerousness at issue during the sentencing phase
of the trial. The majority concluded that the State, both through evidence and
6. Id at 730. The Supreme Court of South Carolina relied on its own ruling in State v.
Shafer, 531 S.E.2d 524,528 (S.C 2000), mtddShafer v. South Carolina, 532 US. 36 (2001). For a
complete discussion of the United States Supreme Court's treatment of Si, see Kathryn Roe
Elridge, Case Note, 14 CAP. DEF.J. 89 (2001) (analyzing Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. Cr. 1263
(2001)).
7. WdA 122 S. O. at 730.
8. Id at 730-31.
9. VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4(A) (Michie 2000) (providing for the life-teans-life
instruction at defendant's request); Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602,616 (Va. 1999)
(holding that the trial court, upon the defendant's request, must instruct the jurythat life imprison-
ment means life imprisonment without parole).
10. KdM 122 S. C. at 730-31;sEwalsoSimwm, 512 US. at 156.
11. 532 US. 36 (2001).
12. )UFA 122 S. 0. at 730-31.
13. Id at 733-34; s S/4, 532 US. at 49-50.
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argument, had done so.1" The Court dealt first with the State's evidence of
Kelly's violent conduct in prison."5 In response to the State's argument that the
evidence onlywent to Kelly's inabilityto behave himself while incarcerated, the
Court explained that the evidence would also have the effect of giving the
defendant a characterization of "generalized future dangerousness." 16 The Court
held more generallythat evidence which is relevant to a finding of future danger-
ousness does not lose that characterization simply because the State uses it to
support other inferences. The import of this holding is that nearlyanyevidence
that the State introduces that would tend to support an inference as to the future
dangerousness of the defendant will require the life-means-life instruction.
The Court then addressed the prosecutor's descriptions of Kelly at trial.18
Although the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that the prosecution's
language merely constituted "a call for retribution," the majority agreed that this
language also would support the conclusion "that petitioner is a vicious predator
who would pose a continuing threat to the community." 9 Because of the
inference that Kelly's violent tendencies made him a continuing danger, the
Court found that the State implicated future dangerousness through its argument
to the jury.2°
Finally, the Court evaluated the State's claim that the life-means-life instruc-
tion was not required because the jurors never indicated explicitlythat theywere
concerned with Kelly's possible release from prison." Stating that the trial judge
has an affirmative duty to instruct the jury on the relevant points of law, regard-
less of whether or not the jurors ask for instruction, the Court dismissed this
argument.' The Court cited prior cases to illustrate that merely because a jury
fails to manifest confusion on a point does not excuse the trial judge from
properly instructing it on the law.2
The dissenters parted from the majoritys view generallyon the grounds that
the rule announced was too broad. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who concurred in
the Smnm case, argued that the majorityin KdytookSmnn far beyond its due
process justification.24 The Cief Justice maintained that the justification for the
Simr rule lies in the fact that fairness requires that the defendant be permitted
14. K 122 S. Q. at 731.
15. I,
16. Id
17. Id at 732.
18. Id at 732-33.
19. Id (quoting Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 US. 154, 176 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).




24. Id at 734 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
2002]
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to rebut the State's contention when it directly places the defendant's future
dangerousness at issue." The new rule, however, requires a Simm instruction
at any point that the jury could ir the defendant's future dangerousness from
the prosecution's evidence. 6 In the Chief Justice's view, this would likely apply
to any evidence of aggravation and therefore would require a Smnm instruction
in every case."
Justice Thomas, however, held the view that there is no due process justifi-
cation for a Sinnm instruction." In Justice Thomas's view, the majority's
opinion was a broad expansion of a rule that was already unmanageable and
vague- 9 Justice Thomas perceived a fundamental federalism problem with the
rule because it ostensibly"preserved] in most cases the State's role in determin-
ing whether to instruct a jury regarding a defendant's eligibility for parole."3"
Further, Justice Thomas argued that the rule "seriously diminished the State's
discretion in this area" byholding that the defendant should be permitted to raise
parole ineligibilityeverytime the State introduces evidence of future dangerous-
ness.3 ' By expanding this rule to require a life-means-life instruction whenever
the State &1Diat future dangerousness, the Court, according to Justice Thomas,
simplyinterferes "further in a State's sentencing proceedings underthe guise that
the Constitution requires us to do so."
32
C IrzrdSat G nmwezau cn Tr E tms
The aspect of Kd/yv Sah Car&i that is of particular interest to practitio-
ners in Virginia is the United States Supreme Court's willingness to dispense with
the state supreme court's interpretation of events at trial and to apply its own
interpretation instead. The Supreme Court of South Carolina was of the opinion
that the prosecution in Ky did not raise the issue of future dangerousness, and
adopted the view that the prosecution introduced evidence merely"designed to
showthat Kellywould not adapt to prison life."" In reversing, the United States
Supreme Court explained. "[I)t is not that the state court failed to pose the legal
issue accurately... [t]he error was rather on the facts: the evidence and the
argument cited by the state court are flatly at odds with the view that 'future
dangerousness was not an issue in this case."'34 The Court explained further that
the legal error of the Supreme Court of South Carolina resulted from its errone-
25. Id at 735.
26. Id at 731, 735.
27. Id at 735-36.




32. Id at 737.
33. Id at 730.
34. Id at 731 (quoting State v. Kely, 540 S.E2d 851, 857 (S.C 2001)).
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ous portrayal of facts in that "[t]he error in trying to distinguish Sinnm this way
lies in failing to recognize that evidence of dangerous 'character' may show
'characteristic' future dangerousness."'
The Court's handling of MeIy may set a precedent for future
recharacterizations of facts emerging from cases decided in the Supreme Court
of Virginia. In past cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia has adopted convenient
characterizations of facts in order to affirm death sentences. In Vionw Cm
nuaih',36 the defendant called two mental health experts who testified as to the
defendant's mental health condition. 7 The experts were of the opinion that the
defendant suffered from "intermittent explosive disorder," which prevented him
from conforming his behavior to law." The Commonwealth presented its own
mental health expert to rebut Vinson's experts, who testified that nearly all
violent criminals suffer from "intermittent explosive disorder" and that the
chances of Vinson committing another violent crime within five years were "at
least fiftypercent."39 On appeal of his death sentence, Vinson argued, inter alia,
that the trial court permitted the Commonwealth's expert to testify to the issue
of future dangerousness on rebuttal although the defense mental health experts
never directly addressed the issue.' The Supreme Court of Virginia, however,
succinctly rejected this claim, explaining that because the defense mental health
experts "offered excuses for defendant's behavior," it was proper for the Com-
monweahh's expert to express opinions on the defendant's future conduct4
The characterization of Vinson's mental health evidence as going to the
issue of future dangerousness, not only gave the Commonwealth a free pass at
offering its expert's opinion on the defendant's future dangerousness, but also
robbed the defendant of a statutorymitigator under Virginia's capital sentencing
scheme.4 This characterization is analogous to the fact characterization which
occured in Kdy, in that the court in that case characterized evidence which clearly
addressed future dangerousness as evidence showing that "Kellywould not adapt
to prison life."43 My suggests that the United States Supreme Court will no
longer be as accepting of the fact characterizations of state supreme courts when
those fact characterizations appear to be convenient artifices to affirm death
sentences. Although the immediate effect of Kd/y v Saxb Cankit is to
35. Id at 732.
36. 522 S.E.d 170 (Va. 1999).
37. Vinson v. Commonveath, 522 S.E.2d 170, 175 (Va. 1999).
38. Id; seeVA. ODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) (lcwhie 2000) (providing that "[the fact that]
the capacity of the defendant to.. . conform his conduct to the requirements of law was signif-
canily impaired" may be considered as a fact in mitigation).
39. Vion, 522 S.E.2d at 175.
40. Id at 178.
41. Id
42. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B)(iv).
43. Kd 122 S. C. at 730.
2002]
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constitutionalize the life-means-life instruction, it can also be seen as a warning
shot directed at the state supreme courts toconduct genuine, substantive review
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